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SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION IN APPELLATE
REVIEW
ALLAN D. VESTAL*
To say that appellate courts must decide between two constructions
proffered by the parties . . . would be to render automatons of judges,
forcing them merely to register their reactions to the arguments of counsel
at the trial level.'
An appellate court decides only the issues presented by the parties.2
These apparently inconsistent statements suggest a very challenging
problem which faces appellate courts. With some frequency a review-
ing court in considering a case will discover an unargued legal issue
which the court feels is decisive of the case. The failure to argue the
point to the appellate court may be a matter of either inadvertence
or intention. The court must then decide, either consciously or un-
consciously, whether it will be restricted to the issues posed by the
litigants. The court must decide whether it will view the controversy
in the terms and issues posed by counsel or whether it will independently
analyze the case in terms and issues of its own making.3
* Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.
1. Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 349, 126 N.E.2d 271,
274 (1955).
2. Hampton v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 652, 656, 242 P.2d 1, 3 (1952). "This Court
will not perform the duties of counsel; it will not examine a record to see if it can find
any errors upon which to reverse a judgment. If the appellant's counsel does not choose,
in some form, to call the attention of the Court to the points, provisions of the statute,
and the authorities upon which he relies, the judgment will be affirmed." Edmondson v.
Alameda County, 24 Cal. 349-50 (1864).
3. This should be distinguished from the situation wherein a court as a matter of dicta
articulates a principle of law not urged or argued by the litigants. See Dickinson v. Porter,
31 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1948), superseded by 240 Iowa 393, 35 N.W.2d 66 (1949); Larkin v.
Tsavaris, 85 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1956); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956),
dicta noted in 42 Iowa L. Rev. 450 (1957). To the litigants in the law suit, dicta is not
vital. Courts, however, use dicta as a device to declare what the law is in a given field.
Certainly the bench and bar of a given jurisdiction cannot safely disregard such statements.
Best v. Yerkes, supra.
Some judges apparently favor the use of dicta to spell out legal principles although a
particular case does not call for it. See, e.g., Mr. justice Clark dissenting in Gold v. United-
States, 352 U.S. 985 (1957); but compare Nelson v. Estill, 175 Ga. 526, 543, 165 S.E. 820,
828 (1932); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992 (1957).
The idea of a court sua sponte considering an issue is not a matter to be found only at
the appellate level. In the trial of a law suit a court on its own motion will consider the
question of jurisdiction of the subject matter. It has been held that the litigants cannot
circumscribe the examination of the court in this area; the litigants cannot waive this issue.
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I. FACTS, LEGAL ISSUES, AND BASES OF DECISION
An appellate court in hearing and deciding a case is concerned with
the facts, the legal questions or issues arising from the factual situation,
and the authorities or bases of decision. In getting the controversy into
a posture suitable for adjudication by a court, the litigants will be
interested primarily in the factual background of the legal questions.'
Either by agreement or by trial, the facts will be established and the
judgment of the trial court will be handed down. Then, if an appeal is
taken, the litigants, in the construction of the record on appeal, have
the right to establish the factual background against which the con-
troversy will be viewed by the appellate court. It is generally assumed
that the appellate court will accept the litigants' statement of the facts
and that the appellate court will not independently investigate the
matter to ascertain whether the facts are as stated or whether there
are additional facts which would alter the outcome of the litigation.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the appellate court
will never go beyond the facts related in the record.5 During the argu-
ment of a divorce case before the Iowa Supreme Court in the
early part of January 1954, it was intimated that the parties had re-
married in California. The court recessed the hearing on the case to
get factual information about the current status of the parties. Finally,
on April 23, 1954, an affidavit of the parties, dated April 17, 1954,
was filed indicating that they had remarried on January 26, 1954. The
court then dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for disposition
by the lower court.6 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States,
sua sponte after an argument of a case, inquired of counsel whether
the defendants were still officials of the state of Oklahoma. The reply
was that the terms of the defendants had expired and that there was no
4. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 464 (2d Cir. 1947); Frank, Courts on Trial, 14 (1949);
Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 I1. L. Rev. 645, 761 (1932).
5. "This section purports to give the Supreme and Appellate Courts power to receive
evidence not produced on the trial.... In so far as section 92 of the Civil Practice Act ...
attempts to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction on the appeal of a cause, of
matters germane upon the trial thereof, this provision contravenes section 2 of article 6 of
the constitution, . . . which provides that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
only, in all cases except in cases relating to the revenue, mandamus and habeas corpus.
The matters offered do not come within the original jurisdiction of the court." Schmidt v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 376 Ill. 183, 198, 33 N.E.2d 485, 492 (1941). See also Wines,
Establishing The Basis For Appellate Review, Ill. L. Forum 135 n. 1 (1952), "A statutory
provision which undertakes to authorize the introduction of new evidence in the reviewing
court has been held unconstitutional as an attempt to confer original jurisdiction on the
court. Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. [supra], cited with approval in Atkins v.
Atkins, 393 Ill. 202, 65 N.E.2d 801 (1946)"; 34 Iowa L. Rev. 521 (1949), commenting on
Lohman v. Edgewater Holding Co., 227 Minn. 40, 33 N.W.2d 842 (1948).
6. Miller v. Miller, 66 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa 1954).
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provision for revival or continuance against the successors in office.
The court then concluded that "it follows that the controversy has
become merely moot and that we have no authority to further consider
or dispose of it."1 The attorneys in this case wanted a decision to
clarify the rights of parties in a continuing controversy. The court,
however, stated: "[T]he absence of power which results from such
disappearance cannot be supplied by the request referred to since after
all it amounts to but a suggestion that that be done which there is no
authority to do; in other words that the cause be decided in the absence
of the parties whose presence is essential to its decision."8
In addition, persons not parties to the action may under certain
circumstances establish facts in the appellate court which will terminate
the justiciability of a case in that court.9 In one case in the United
States Supreme Court, it was noted that:
[I]t appearing to the court here, from affidavits and other evidence filed in this case
in behalf of persons not parties to this suit, that this appeal is not conducted by
parties having adverse interests, but for the purpose of obtaining a decision of this
court, to affect the interests of persons not parties-it is therefore now here ordered
and adjudged by this court, that the appeal in this case be and the same is hereby
dismissed. ... 1o
Although the general rule is that litigants control the factual milieu
of the controversy, there are exceptions and occasionally the appellate
courts can and will go beyond the record presented. 1
In an analysis of the authorities, precedents, and bases of decisions,
the judges of the appellate courts generally feel that they have the right
to go beyond the materials presented by counsel. Although counsel
will present cases and other materials in briefs and oral arguments,
the court may go beyond these authorities and in independent examina-
7. Shaffer v. Howard, 249 U.S. 200, 201 (1919). See also Williams v. Simons, 355 U.S.
49 (1957); Robertson and Kirkham, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States § 277 (2d ed., Wolfson & Kurland, 1951).
8. Shaffer v. Howard, supra note 7. Generally, reviewing courts will note developments
which have occurred since the decision in the lower court. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
600 (1935); Missouri ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Comm., 273 U.S. 126 (1927);
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503 (1912). See also Fink v. Continental
Foundry & Machine Co., 240 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1957).
9. Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States
§ 276 (2d ed., Wolfson & Kurland, 1951).
10. Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 419, 426 (1861).
11. The appellate court can either consider the additional facts or the court can send
the case back down to the lower court to let-that court consider the additional facts and
render a decision based upon such facts. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 739 (1947); Hel-
vering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 247 (1937); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892); Estho v. Lear, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 130 (1833).
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tion reach a conclusion concerning the legal issue posed.' - As one
court has stated, "upon an appeal, while we are limited to the points
or questions made, we are not limited to the arguments submitted, or
to the authorities cited."' 3 The courts have always felt free to reach a
decision concerning a given legal issue on any grounds available.' 4 The
12. "Thus the Supreme Court has said that an appellate court reviews judgments not
statements in opinions. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 76 S. Ct. 824. The party's failure
to call the trial court's attention to a relevant statute does not preclude the appellate court
from considering it . . . . A court of review may consider and construe a statute deter-
minative of the case which was not specifically called to the attention of the trial court."
Huntress v. Estate of Huntress, 235 F.2d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1956). "Curiously enough,
these statutes were not presented to the District Court for consideration. We must con-
sider them here." FDIC v. Vest, 122 F.2d 765, 768 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
696 (1941).
13. District Township of Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601, 603 (1875). The lower court
decision was correct if only the arguments presented were considered, but the court re-
versed upon a theory not urged, "that where the party against whom a cause of action
existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such
other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from
the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been
discovered." Id. at 603.
14. Courts have held the general rule against sua sponte consideration is subject to an
exception in the case of a change in the law applicable. Most courts apparently feel that
they can and should consider intervening changes in the law even though not argued to
the court. The Supreme Court of the United States noted this a century and a half ago
when it stated, "It is, in the general, true, that the province of an appellate court is only
to inquire whether a judgment, when rendered, was erroneous or not. But if, subsequent
to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied."
United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801). More recently
this same idea has been articulated by courts, federal and state, and commentators. In
Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 1934), a state court decision
had changed the applicable law after the district court opinion, and the circuit court in
reversing the case on the basis of the change in Missouri law said, "We regard this case
as an exceptional one and analogous to those in which a change of the law after trial has
required a reversal of a judgment right when rendered. . . . [W]e think it is our duty to
recognize the changed situation and 'to give effect to a matter arising since its judgment,
and bearing directly upon the right disposition of the case.'"
The Oregon Supreme Court in Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros., 192 Ore. 23,
233 P.2d 258 (1951), reversed a lower court decision after the ruling in Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). "After this decision was rendered, on
motion of the defendant, we ordered the filing of supplemental briefs and a reargument,
directed to the effect of the Schwegmann decision on the present case. . . . The general
rule . . . is that the parties to an appeal are restricted to the theory upon which the cause
was presented or defended in the trial court . . . . But, in the posture of this case, that
rule must yield to the court's right to notice a plain error when that is essential to prevent
a miscarriage of justice. . . And this is emphatically so when 'questions of a general
public nature affecting the interest of the state at large' are involved . . . ; and when to
ignore the issue would be to lend the aid of a court of equity to the accomplishment of
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judge writing the opinion will consider the briefs, his own fund of
information concerning the area of the law involved, the precedents
discoverable in the library, what his research assistant can uncover,
and other materials called to his attention. Without a doubt, there is
a feeling of absolute freedom concerning sources from which the just
answer to legal problems is to be ascertained.
A third fact, which arises in point of time before the consideration of
legal authorities, is that of determining what legal questions or issues
are posed by the case submitted to the court. Here, there is not the
rigid, almost complete acceptance of the articulation of the attorney as
in the case of the factual environment. Neither is there the complete
freedom as in the case of the examination of decisional materials. In
determining the legal-issues, a general rule-in both law and equity
casesk--is that, "an appellate court decides only the issues presented by
the parties. . ,,. The same idea was reflected when a court stated
"[that] is a question that has not been submitted and hence need not
what has now been determined to be an illegal act." 192 Ore. at 28, 233 P.2d at 260. "If
the record here discloses that the transactions involved affect interstate commerce, then,
in view of the decision in the Schwegmann case, it would become manifest that a wrong
result was reached in the Circuit Court and that an affirmance would make final a decree
which could not be justified under the law. ... The case is, therefore, an exceptional one,
not governed by the general rule as to the scope of review by an appellate court, and we
conceive it to be our duty to examine the record for the purpose of determining whether
or not the plaintiff's price-fixing arrangement affects interstate commerce, and is, therefore,
illegal as determined in the Schwegmann case." 192 Ore. at 31, 233 P.2d at 261, 262.
See also Moore's Judicial Code 571 (1949) wherein it is stated "in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction it has power to make such disposition of the case as justice re-
quires; in so doing the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law,
which has supervened since the judgment under review was entered; and may, because of
the supervening change, vacate that judgment and remand the case to the state court so
that it may be free to act."
15. "On an appeal in an equity suit, the whole case is before the court, and it is bound
to decide the same, so far as it is in a condition to be decided, on its merits." Waterloo
Mining Co. v. Doe, 82 Fed. 45, 51 (9th Cir. 1897). "Whilst the action is in equity and is
real merits of the controversy." Jordan Co. v. Sperry Bros., 141 Iowa 225, 227, 119 N.W.
692, 693 (1909) ; cf. "It is the prevalent equity rule that only errors properly assigned will
be considered on review." Orfield, Appellate Procedure in Equity Cases: A Guide for Ap-
peals at Law, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 563, 578 (1942). Professor Orfield then lists certain ex-
amples of exceptions to the general rule. The rules and statutes both restricting and
liberalizing sua sponte consideration on review do not make any distinction between cases
at law and in equity. It would seem to be fair to say that the law-equity dichotomy
is not fundamental in the area. Courts in some cases refer to the de novo review
by appellate courts in equity cases. This may make the attitude of the courts more liberal
in reviewing matters on the court's own motion. The equitable nature of the case has been
decisive or of great weight only rarely in deciding whether to consider a matter sua sponte.
16. Hampton v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 652, 656, 242 P.2d 1, 3 (1952).
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be decided."'1 7 A number of statutes' and rules of court" so provide. On
the other hand, a number of courts have suggested and held that an
appellate court is not necessarily restricted to issues proffered by the
litigants, so that it is quite apparent that exceptions to the general rule
do exist20 Categorizing the exceptions, however, is not simple.
17. Laramore v. Laramore, 64 So. 2d 662, 670 (Fla. 1953). The same idea is found in
the following statements: "No constitutional question was suggested or argued below or
here. And as a general rule, this Court will not consider any question not raised below and
presented by the petition. . . . Here it does not decide either of the questions presented
but, changing the rule of decision in force since the foundation of the Government, remands
the case to be adjudged according to a standard never before deemed permissible." Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 (1938) (dissenting opinion). "No application has
been made for reconsideration of the constitutional question there decided . . . [the State
of New York] is not entitled and does not ask to be heard upon the question whether
the Adkins case should be overruled." Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587, 604, 605 (1936). "The court can only decide questions that are before it." Esselstyn
v. Casteel, 205 Ore. 344, 347, 288 P.2d 215, 217 (1955).
See also Elson v. Security State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 605, 67 N.W.2d 525, 528 (1954)
wherein the dissenting judge stated, "I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion
is contrary to countless decisions of this and other courts that a case will not be reversed
upon a proposition not argued. See also 58 I.C.A. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 344(a)
(4) (Third) which says, 'Errors or propositions not stated or argued shall be deemed
waived.'"
18. For example, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 4.88.200 (1952): "Any questions of fact or
of law, decided upon trials by the court or by referees, in either legal or equitable causes,
may be reviewed, when exceptions to the findings of fact or to the conclusions of law, or
both, have been duly taken, by either party and sent up in the record on appeal; and in
actions legal or equitable, tried by the court below without a jury, wherein a statement
of facts or bill of exceptions has been certified, the evidence of facts shown by such bill
of exceptions or statement of facts shall be examined by the Supreme Court de novo, in
so far as the findings of fact or a refusal to make findings based thereon have been ex-
cepted to, and the cause shall be determined by the record on appeal, including such excep-
tions or statement." See also note 90 infra.
19. For example, Iowa R. Civ. P. 344(a) (4) (Third): "Errors or propositions not
stated or argued shall be deemed waived." See also Iowa R. Civ. P. 371: "The supreme
court shall have power to revoke, change or supplement any of these rules which prescribe
the procedure in that court. Under this power the court may revoke, change or supplement
any rule in division XVI hereof except rules 331-339 inclusive." See also note 90 infra.
20. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34 (1939) (request that Court use plain error doc-
trine; Court stated that it had the power to note plain error not presented). The same
idea was urged in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 n. 2 (1958) in which he stated, "It is of course not a rigid rule of
this Court to restrict consideration of a case merely to arguments advanced by counsel."
When the Supreme Court of Michigan was faced recently with the question of sua sponte
consideration of a matter, Mr. Justice Black stated that, "There is no hard and fast rule that
appellate courts, sitting either in law or equity, cannot and hence do not raise and decide
important question sua sponte. Indeed, a mere glance at available precedent will disclose
the contrary. True, the power is exercised sparingly and with full realization of the
restrictions and limitations inherent in the employment thereof." City of Dearborn v.
Bacila, 353 Mich. 99, 90 N.W.2d 863, 873 (1958).
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II. REASONS FOR APPELLATE REvIEw
Appellate courts have been a part of the tradition of the common
law for centuries. 21 Although litigants have no absolute, constitutional 22
right to appellate review of decisions of trial court, the re-examination
of cases by a reviewing court has been the rule rather than the exception.
With one noteworthy exception,23 American states, American territories,
and the federal government have traditionally provided multiple levels
of courts with the right of appeal from one level to another. The fact
of appellate review is quite clear; the rationale of appellate review is less
clear. However, a number of concepts, persuasively urged, seem to
be valid.
First, appellate courts have been rationalized as courts for the cor-
rection of errors of the trial courts. 25 The underlying reasoning is
that trial courts, in deciding questions presented to them, will in ,the
nature of things.err, that the judges of inferior courts will make mistakes
of law. Therefore, it follows, appellate courts are necessary to rectify
such errors.
Second, and this is quite different from the first, appellate courts have
been justified as assuring litigants that the controversy between them
Other courts have adopted this position. The following statements are examples: "No
objection to this action of the court or to the plaintiff's opening statement was interposed
by the railroad's attorney, and the points are not raised on appeal; therefore, we do not
reverse the judgment on such grounds, though this court may notice a plain error of its
own motion if justice requires it .. . ." Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Kammerer, 205 F.2d
525, 526 (5th Cir. 1953); "The right . . .of an appellate court to notice a plain error
where that is essential to prevent a miscarriage of justice, even in a civil case, has been
recognized." Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 1934).
21. See generally Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases (1941); Holdsworth, His-
tory of English Law (1938).
22. "Under it [due process clause] he may neither claim a right to trial by jury nor a
right of appeal." Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930); Hubbard v. Marsh, 239
Iowa 472, 32 N.W.2d 67 (1948) (principle reamrmed that right of appeal is not inherent
nor constitutional and may be granted or withheld by the legislature); Van Der Burg v.
Bailey, 207 Iowa 797, 223 N.W. 515 (1929); Washita Ranger Oil Co. v. Disney, 264 S.W.
630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (privilege of requiring an appellate court to reverse the pro-
ceeding of a trial court is dependent upon legislative grant and regulation).
23. Lamar, A Unique and Unfamiliar Chapter In Our American Legal History, 10
A.BA..J. 513 (1924).
24. See cases cited in notes 25 to 37 infra.
25. "The judge may make a mistake. Indeed, it is expected that judges will occasionally
make mistakes; otherwise there wouldn't be appellate courts. And all judges of any
humility at all know that they make quite a fair percentage of mistakes." Judge Wyzanski
speaking in Ware v. Garvey, 139 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Mass. 1956). "As has been well said,
appellate courts are established for correction of the errors of trial courts, and 'only in
very exceptional cases can a point not brought to the attention of the court below and
not passed upon by that court be raised upon appeal.'" Zindler v. Buchanon, 61 A.2d
616, 617 (Mun. Ct. D.C. 1948).
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will be decided correctly. This does not turn upon the question or
questions presented to the trial court, but considers the law suit in a
broader aspect.26 The appellate court, it is urged, will offer a second
opportunity to get a correct decision of the controversy. This, of
course, assumes that an appellate court will be more able to ascertain
where justice lies than will an inferior court.2 7 The emphasis in this
rationale is upon the controversy and its solution in a just manner,
without being limited to the litigants' view of the case.
Third, one may justify appellate review in terms of uniformity of
decisions. This does not place correctness of decision as the sina qua
non; here rather one places equality of treatment as the primary con-
sideration.2 8 In referring to an appellate court, a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, speaking of the experience of Georgia where
for seventy years there were only trial courts, said:
26. This, of course, is reflected in the disagreement over the question of considering
matters not urged in the lower courts. Where appellate courts are viewed as established
to rectify errors, only matters urged at the lower level will be considered; where the court
is viewed as one to dispense justice, all matters will be considered. See pp. 490-93 infra.
For examples of this broader approach to appellate review, see In re Kruger, 130 Cal. 621,
63 Pac. 31, 33 (1900) ("there is no such rule that points not made at the trial cannot be
made here. . . . It was not necessary to show that the same argument was made below");
In re Initiative Petition No. 10 of Oklahoma City, 186 Okla. 497, 98 P.2d 896, 897 (1940)
("There is here no question of public policy or public interest in which situations this court
may review a matter not presented below.").
The vitality of the opposite point of view should not be underestimated. For example,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949),
wherein he stated, "This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We
do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of indi-
vidual expediency." And see Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 1157, 66 N.W.2d 267,
275 (1954), wherein the court stated, "We cannot find it was ever urged to the trial court
and we cannot and should not consider it on appeal." See also Watts v. Elmore, 198 Okla.
141, 176 P.2d 220 (1946), and Shaw v. Edwards, 198 Okla. 79, 175 P.2d 315 (1946).
27. But see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev.
751 (1957).
28. On the importance of uniformity of treatment, see United States v. Ohio Power Co.,
353 U.S. 98, 99 (1957), wherein the Court sua sponte vacated an order more than six
months after it was handed down so that the case "might be disposed of consistently
with . . . companion cases. . . . We have consistently ruled that the interest in finality
of litigation must yield where the interests of justice would make unfair the strict applica-
tion of our rules."
The importance of uniformity of decisions is recognized in Rule 38 of the Rules of The
Supreme Court of the United States. See particularly parts 5(a) and (b).
"The Supreme Court's function is for the purpose of expounding and stabilizing prin-
ciples of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon constitutional
questions and other important questions of law for the public benefit. It is to preserve
uniformity of decision among the intermediate courts of appeal." Chief Justice Taft in
Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922). See
also Cardozo, Selected Writings 153 (1947).
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Probably nine men out of ten would think that the main purpose of such a Court
was to correct errors which had, in some way, impaired or denied the rights of a
private litigant. And yet the records show that between 1810 and 1845, the strong
and reiterated argument for such a Court was its value to the general body of the
public. Governor after governor attacked the system on the ground that it produced
not only infinite confusion, but positive conflict in the law, harmful to the litigant,
but more harmful to the public. 2
9
This Justice spoke of the confusion and uncertainty and indicated that
the "situation was intolerable." In discussing the place of a supreme
court, he pointed out that such a court brings "certainty out of doubt.
This is really one of the silent, unconsidered, yet most valuable functions
of a supreme court. Not that it is infallible, but that it can authoritative-
ly settle disputed questions and make uniform a law that might be
differently and variously decided by the ablest and most upright
men .... M0
A fourth rationale is that of establishing a corpus juris for a jurisdic-
tion. 1 The importance of this concept is recognized in Rule 38 of the
United States Supreme Court wherein certain rules are indicated for
the exercise of the discretionary review under writs of certiorari. The
Court indicates that it will exercise its power when there is a "special
and important question of federal law which has not been, but should
be, settled by" the Supreme Court.2 Within the past year the
Supreme Court of the United States has been rent by an internecine
conflict over the proper function of an appellate court. Although there
is some controversy in specific areas, most would agree with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's position as an abstract proposition of law when he states:
"This is not the supreme court of review for every case decided 'unjustly'
by every court in the country."3 3 In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view,
the Supreme Court of the United States is concerned only with "consti-
tutional issues or other questions of national importance." 34 Certainly
29. Lamar, A Unique and Unfamiliar Chapter in Our American Legal History, 10
A.B.A.J. 513, 515 (1924).
30. Id. at 516.
31. "One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and
impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even
arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent."
Cardozo, Selected Writings 153 (1947). As to the effect of a decided case on the deciding
court at a later time, see Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957);
and on a lower court, Houston Farms Development Co. v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 520
(5th Cir. 1952); Nichols v. Sprague S.S. Co., 119 F. Supp. 443 (D. Mass. 1954). See also
Wright, op. cit. supra note 27.
32. Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 38(5).
33. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 541 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
34. Id. at 547. See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Gibson v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 874 (1956).
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one of the primary functions of any appellate court is to establish the
corpus juris for its jurisdiction.3 5 Under common law jurisprudential
concepts, law is established and grows through the decisions primarily
of appellate courts.
Other factors become apparent in an examination of appellate review.
Some are intangible and tangential but nevertheless of real importance.
The stabilizing influence of the existence of reviewing courts,38 the
prestige which a high court can lend to a court system, and the delay
to be found in judicial review are such factors. 37
In any analysis of the place and function of appellate review, it
becomes quite clear that these various factors are not mutually ex-
clusive. 38 Rather, the court in considering and deciding any given case
may be motivated by any one or perhaps several of these factors in
varying degree. Of course, these factors do not always work toward
the same end.39
35. "[I1n view of the possibility that the rule of law as announced in Lane v.
Beveridge may have affected property rights and guided the conduct of public officials,
we deem it our duty, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to withdraw the statement in
our former opinion overruling this decision." Esselstyn v. Casteel, 205 Ore. 344, 372, 288
P.2d 215, 216 (1955).
36. "Amid the cross-currents and shifting sands of public life the law is like a great
rock upon which a man may set his feet and be safe, while the inevitable inequalities of
private life are not so dangerous in a country where every citizen knows that in the Law
Courts, at any rate, he can get justice." Lord Sankey, in 1929, then Lord Chancellor of
England. Hewart, The New Despotism 151 (1929).
37. "Judicial review gives time for the sober second thought. . . . The cooling period
is good for most hotly-contested issues. And where basic fundamental rights of the citizen
are at stake, the contemplative pause, necessitated by judicial review, may be critical ...
It assures that basic unfairness will be corrected .... " Douglas, We The Judges 445
(1956).
38. Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 28.
39. See Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) (justice
to litigants perhaps required affirmance but corpus juris demanded reversal); Wehrman v.
Farmers' & Merchants' Savings Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935) (no error by
lower court in ruling on case as argued by litigants, but reversal required if law to be
correctly applied).
"If I could revise the precedent doctrine, it would require that a court should never
change a rule, retroactively, in its application to any person when the court has reason
to believe that he actually relied on that rule and would be harmed substantially by the
change; but the court would he free to change an unjust rule as to all other persons, both
retroactively and prospectively." Frank, Courts on Trial 270 (1949). See Collins v. Webb,
133 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (state court has power to give overruling decision pros-
pective application only, and to deny it any retroactive effect); Hare v. General Contract
Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952) (present transaction not usurious,
but subsequent transactions will be).
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III. GENERAL RULE
A number of arguments and rationalizations have been urged for the
general rule that an appellate court will not consider sua sponte a legal
argument not presented and urged by the litigants. 40 These might be
summarized as follows: (1) the litigants have a right to control the
litigation, therefore the court should decide only those questions raised
by the parties; (2) no error requiring rectification has been committed
by the lower court since the lower court has-by definition-not ruled
on the matter if the question is raised for the first time by the appellate
court sua sponte; (3) in some cases this last concept has been enlarged
into a fundamental, jurisdictional limitation which foreclosed the con-
sideration of a question not raised in the lower court; and finally (4) the
losing party has had no opportunity to rebut the argument accepted by
the court, which may in fact be erroneous, and the court has received no
assistance in deciding the question from the litigants who are well
informed in the matter. Now to consider these rationales seriatim.
A. Control by Litigants
The common law system of jurisprudence is based upon the adversary
principle. Our courts are passive instrumentalities, available to right
wrongs, but the initiative is never theirs.41 Our courts require the catalyst
of a litigant who seeks relief. A concomitant of this attitude is that the
litigants have the right to control the course of the law suit. Courts
generally allow litigants to agree by stipulation to do all sorts of things
not authorized by rule or statute. Although there has been a movement
away from absolute control in the hands of litigants in the area of
procedure, much of this is still to be found. Courts allow litigants to
stipulate the facts involved,' to waive time limitations in connection
with the filing of papers4 s and to decide when c6ses will be tried.44
40. See Note, Raising New Issues on Appeal, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 652 (1951).
41. "Take a poor man with a poor lawyer . . . a case argued with a giant on one
side and a pygmy on the other, and the judge hearing the case whose associations have
been with the rich. What show has the poor fellow got? Nobody is crooked or dishonest;
it is just the natural course of evolution that has made the law of today. You can't get
into court for nothing. Even if you could you couldn't get along by yourself. You must
have a lawyer. You can have any kind of a lawyer you can pay for. But you can't try
your own case. You don't know how. The judge won't help you. He sits there to umpire
the game and nothing else; it's all a lottery. If your case is just, that counts nothing....
There is only one true thing about it, you can always get a run for your money, as long
as you have got any there is another court. There is no effort in the courts to get at
abstract justice." Clarence Darrow, in Bruce, The American Judge 10-11 (1924).
42. Gillespie v. Norris, 231 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1956); Newman v. Granger, 141 F. Supp.
37 (W I. Pa. 1956).
43. Vestal, A Decade of Practice Under the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 Iowa L.
Rev. 439, 448 (1953).
44. Id. at 449.
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Litigants decide whether a law suit will be started and against whom.4 5
Courts allow litigants to waive certain claims 46 and defenses47 and to
establish the record to be considered by an appellate court.48 Is it any
wonder, then, that courts have allowed litigants to cast the law suit in
certain terms, even though those represent a totally incorrect analysis
of the situation. A classic example is Wehrman v. Farmers' & Merchants'
Say. Bank.4" In this case, involving descent of property, a great deal
of evidence was introduced and arguments urged concerning the sequence
of deaths of a mother and twin children delivered post mortem by
Caesarean section. All this, when in fact such sequence has had no
significance under the applicable state law either before or since the
decision on the descent of property in this particular factual situation.
The court, in fact, on petition for rehearing acknowledged that it "must
be conceded" that the argument was entirely irrelevant. 50 But the
court refused to grant the petition for rehearing; since the correct
argument had not been urged initially, the court would not consider it.
The litigants had controlled the course of the law suit even to the point
of having the case decided on a completely irrelevant point.
The control of the litigants is clearly spelled out in many statutes and
rules of court. In Iowa, for example, Rule of Civil Procedure 344(a)
states that "Errors or propositions not stated or argued shall be deemed
waived,"'" while the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
indicate this same concept when it is stated that "only the questions
specifically brought forward by the petition for writ of certiorari will
be considered." 52 This is all part of the orderly presentation which is so
much sought by the legal technicians interested in the smooth func-
tioning of the judicial machinery.5 3 Even though vital principles may
45. See Moore's Federal Practice § 14.15 (1948).
46. By not commencing an action within the period of the statute of limitations.
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h).
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 75(g): "The Clerk of the District Court . . . shall transmit to the
appellate court a true copy of the matter designated by the parties, but shall always in-
dude, whether or not designated, copies of the following: . . . the designations or stipula-
tions of the parties as to matter to be included in the record; and any statement by the
appellant of the points on which he intends to rely ..
49. 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935.
50. 221 Iowa 263, 266 N.W. 290, 291 (1936).
51. See Chief Justice Garfield dissenting in Elson v. Security State Bank, 246 Iowa
601, 67 N.W.2d 525, 528 (1954). See also Iowa R. Civ. P. 340(b): "If the abstract
does not embrace the whole record, and all evidence and proceedings in the transcript,
depositions and exhibits, it shall include a concise statement of all points upon which
appellant will rely on the appeal, which shall be limited thereto."
52. Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 38. Compare Rule
27(6).
53. In Fransioli v. Brue, 4 Wash. 124, 125, 29 Pac. 928 (1892), it was argued that there
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be involved, some judges will fall back on this right of litigants to
control the course of the case as a barrier against sua sponte considera-
tion by the bench.54 In a case before the United States Supreme Court
involving possible unconstitutional discrimination, Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, refused to consider the matter. Rather he stated:
It may or may not be that if the facts were called to our attention in a proper way
the objection would prove to be real .... It rests with counsel to take the proper
steps, and if they deliberately omit them, we do not feel called upon to institute
inquiries on our own account. Laws frequently are enforced which the court recog-
nizes as possibly or probably invalid if attacked by a different interest or in a dif-
ferent way. Therefore, without prejudice to the question that we have suggested,
when it shall be raised, we must conclude that so far as the present case is concerned
the judgment must be affirmed. 55
In this language one sees the reluctance to act affirmatively. Here is
the common-law court, willing to judge but unwilling to act the advocate.
were not facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but appellant failed to suggest such
in his brief, and the court stated: "The statute provides that this question may be raised
at any time. This provision must, however, be reasonably construed; and thus construed
we think it must be held to mean simply that such question can be raised at any time in
the orderly course of argument. What is such orderly course of argument? All points
relied upon on appeal are required to be stated in the briefs of the respective parties, the
briefs are, in fact, the formal presentation of the cause, and when all are on file in a
particular case, such case is fully made up and cannot thereafter be added to without the
consent of all parties and the court.... By failing to suggest it in his brief appellant lost
the right to insist upon it." Jurisdiction of the subject matter was excepted from this
interpretation.
54. This idea of estoppel is found in the following cases: United States v. Hancock
Truck Lines, Inc., 324 U.S. 774, 779-80 (1945), the court stating: "It was manifestly im-
proper to reverse the Commission's order [in the District Court] in respect of a provision
therein as to which the suitor had advised [the ICC] it no longer objected but acquiesced";
Lumpkin v. Meeks, 263 Ala. 395, 397, 82 So. 2d 535, 537 (1955), wherein it was stated,
"Let it suffice to say that the petition in this cause was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction
of the equity court and as no objection was made below to the form of the petition and
the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the equity court, we will not avoid this pro-
ceeding on appeal"; Verlinden v. Godberson, 238 Iowa 161, 166, 25 N.W.2d 347, 350 (1946),
the court stating: "Having gone to trial on the petition, and having litigated the issue
raised without objection, and not having objected to evidence offered to establish such
claim of waste, we do not think that the objection now made by appellant can be of any
avail to him .. ."; Buckley v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 343 Mich. 83, 85, 72 N.W.2d 210,
211 (1955), "Accordingly, we pass on none of those questions. Plaintiffs' statement of ques-
tions involved raises but one other question, the parties agree it is a question to be de-
termined, and it alone do we decide, namely, whether the projected soil removing and
leveling operation is violative of the provisions of ordinance No. 64 zoning the property
'residential'."
"As an almost universal rule, this court may very justly presume that the counsel who
tried the case in the court below fully comprehends the issues which were necessary to be
submitted to the jury in order to protect his client's rights ... " Nightingale v. Barnes, 47
Wis. 389, 399, 2 N.W. 767, 774 (1879) (dissenting opinion).
55. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63, 64 (1912).
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This same attitude was revealed in a rather recent decision of the Iowa
Supreme Court wherein the court apparently acted sua sponte. The
court later changed its position, and withdrew the opinion in part at
least because of the stinging attack of the dissenting opinion wherein
it was stated:
The majority has no right to reach out and supply the principal ground on which it
holds this act void. In doing so it has assumed the role of advocate. This is a plain
violation of the fundamental rule, repeatedly and universally recognized, that a
reversal will not be ordered on a ground not properly raised in the court below,
much less upon one not advanced in this court. 5 6
Time and again the courts have indicated that the attorneys are the
ones who are fully informed on the litigation and the interests of their
clients. They are the only ones who are in a position to evaluate the
whole picture. It follows that the attorneys have a right and duty
to decide exactly what positions will be taken. 57 Articulating the idea,
judges have stated:
As an almost universal rule, this court may very justly presume that the counsel who
tried the case in the court below fully comprehends the issues which were necessary
to be submitted to a jury in order to protect his client's rights .... 58
The true application is to permit the litigants over matters of private right to say
for themselves what the dispute is, and that certain proof will warrant a recovery. 59
B. Correction of Errors
When a matter is considered sua sponte at the appellate level it rarely
has been presented for the consideration of the trial court. 60  If the
56. Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d 110, 126 (Iowa 1948). The subsequent opinion is
reported in 240 Iowa 393, 35 N.W.2d 66 (1948).
57. Trans-Continental Mutual Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 262 Ala. 373, 376, 78 So. 2d 917,
919-20 (1955). "Wherever possible, cases should be reviewed by this Court on the issues
conceived by the contending parties in the trial court and the questions presented to, and
determined by, the trial judge."
58. Nightingale v. Barnes, 47 Wis. 389, 399, 2 N.W. 767, 774 (1879) (dissenting opinion).
59. Heiman v. Felder, 178 Iowa 740, 752, 160 N.W. 234, 239 (1916).
60. Some of the same considerations as those being presented are found in those cases
where a matter, not properly presented in the lower court, is urged to the appellate court.
The appellate court must then decide whether such matter will be considered. "Ordinarily
an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below. . . . There may
always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or
appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which
were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court . . . below." Hormel v. Helvering, 312
U.S. 552, 556-57 (1941).
See also Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909); Robertson and Kirkham,
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 418 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland
1951). But see Swiss Bankverein v. Zimmermann, 240 Fed. 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1917), wherein
a question was raised in the trial court, but not on appeal, and the court stated: "we have
a right under our rule 11 . . . to 'notice a plain error not assigned,' and we have less hesita-
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appellate court is viewed solely as a court for the correction of errors,
it is powerless when faced with an error not called to the attention
of the lower court. Since the lower court has not been given an
opportunity to consider the matter and rectify it, the lower court has
not erred, and it follows that the appellate court cannot act.61 The logic
here is that the litigants must call the question to the attention of the
lower court.
This [is] in fairness to both the lower court and the opposing party so that each may
have the opportunity of promptly remedying the error, if it in fact amounts to error,
and is of a character to be subject to correction.6 2
The law requires that errors, to be reviewable, must have been definitely and timely
called to the attention of the trial court, in order to afford that court a fair oppoi-
tunity to pass upon the matter, and correct its own errors, if any.6 3
This again is just a phase of the orderliness required in the treatment
of controversies. Piecemeal presentation of arguments runs counter to
such thinking, and therefore courts generally are reluctant to allow
new arguments to be urged at the appellate level.64
Deference to the lower courts is an additional basis upon which this
concept is grounded. Appellate courts generally feel that respect must
be shown to the inferior courts and that a lower court should not be
reversed when it in fact committed no error.65 This, of course, is mean-
tion in doing so because the question was fully presented to and considered by the trial
judge."
61. "It has been our universal holding, . . . that an issue or contention not raised in
the lower court cannot be considered on appeal." McCornack v. Pickrell, 231 Iowa 737,
741, 2 N.W.2d 57, 59 (1942); accord, Kallem v. Kallem, 232 Iowa 1269, 8 N.W.2d 250
(1943). See also Kurtz v. Kurtz, 228 Iowa 256, 290 N.W. 686 (1940); supra note 26.
62. Harrison v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 251 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Mo. App. 1952).
63. Arkansas Bridge Co. v. Kelly-Atkinson Const. Co., 282 Fed. 802, 804 (8th Cir.
1922). To the same effect is the dissent of justice Taylor in Nightingale v. Barnes, 47 Wis.
389, 398, 2 N.W. 767, 773 (1879), in which he stated: "Upon the questions litigated in the
court below there was no error committed by that court, and therefore, no errors for this
court to correct; and the only way this court can raise any error in the case is to introduce
a defense which the defendant did not make in the court below, and which I think he
dearly waived, and then hold that, if such defense had been made, the evidence was suf-
ficient to have sustained it, and therefore the judgment must be reversed."
64. Diggs v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 241 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Waechter, 195 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1952). It should be noted that this argument against
sua sponte consideration of an argument is not valid if the argument has been urged at
the lower level. There is a possibility that the lower court had considered and rejected the
argument, and that the litigants chose not to make the argument to the appellate court.
Usually, however, consideration sua sponte goes hand in hand with failure to consider the
matter in the lower court. See notes 26 and 60 supra.
65. This, of course, does not keep an appellate court from considering all authority
available on the legal question at hand. Where a controlling decision has been handed
down since the decision in the lower court, the appellate court will note the change in the
law. Johnson v. Union Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 957 (1957). See also Boynton v. Moffat
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ingful only when the sua sponte consideration would result in a reversal.
Deference does not foreclose sua sponte consideration to affirm a decision
erroneously reached. 66
There is a matter of fundamental importance in the federal-state
relationship which bars the consideration of matters sua sponte by the
United States Supreme Court in a case coming from the highest court of
the state. As Mr. Justice Brandeis has stated, in a case coming from a
state court, "Our power of review is limited not only to the question
whether a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was denied...
but to the particular claims duly made below, and denied .... This is a
writ of error to a state court. 6 7 The vitality of this particular doctrine
may be somewhat questionable at the present time in view of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Terminiello v. Chicago,68
wherein the Court apparently disregarded this limitation. The change
in the personnel of the Court since this decision makes the question an
open one. Certainly the limiting consideration has a champion in Mr.
Justice Frankfurter whose remarks have clearly spelled out the classic
point of view. Dissenting in the Terminiello case, he stated:
For the first time in the course of the 130 years in which State prosecutions have
come here for review, this Court is today reversing a sentence imposed by a State
court on a ground that was urged neither here nor below and that was explicitly dis-
claimed on behalf of the petitioner at the bar of this Court....
The relation of the United States and the courts of the United States to the States
Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F.2d 772, 777 (10th Cir. 1932), the court stating that:
"[Slince appeals in equity are trials de novo, and since equity speaks as of the present
... we need not explore the effect of that order [no longer in force]."
66. See cases cited in notes 123-25 infra.
67. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 380 (1927) (concurring opinion), quoted
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
10 n. 1 (1949).
"[T]he Court is properly cognizant that the question must be timely and properly
raised in accordance with state practice, where that practice is reasonably calculated to
permit it, unless, of course, the highest court actually entertains the question and decides it.
If the question is not so raised and the highest court of the state accordingly declines to
consider it, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review." Moore's Judicial Code
571 (1949). See also Wines, Establishing The Basis for Appellate Review, Ill. L. Forum
135, 146 (1952), wherein the author concludes that "The federal requirement that a federal
question must be 'set up and specially claimed' and preserved for review in the state courts
is more than a principle of federal appellate procedure. It marks the limits of the United
States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has many
times held that it is without jurisdiction to review a question that was not 'set up and
specially claimed' and preserved for review in the state court."
68. 337 U.S. 1 (1949); see Note, Scope of Supreme Court Review: The Terminiello
Case in Focus, 59 Yale L.J. 971 (1950). The Terminiello decision is also noted in 38 Geo.
L.J. 94 (1949); 9 Law. Guild Rev. 70 (1949); 21 Miss. L.J. 278 (1950); 7 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 75 (1950) ; 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 65 (1949).
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and the courts of the States . . . is too delicate to permit silence when a judgment
of a State court is reversed in disregard of the duty of this Court to leave untouched
an adjudication of a State unless that adjudication is based upon a claim of a federal
right which the State has had an opportunity to meet and to recognize. If such a
federal claim was neither before the State court nor presented to this Court, this
Court unwarrantably strays from its province in looking through the record to find
some federal claim that might have been brought to the attention of the State court
and, if so brought, fronted, and that might have been, but was not, urged here. This
is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi
under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency. 69
This specific limitation, of course, has no application outside of the
very narrow area of Supreme Court review of state court decisions.70
It is, however, an attempt to elevate to a constitutional doctrine the
generally accepted idea that a lower court should be given an opportunity
to rule on a matter initially.
C. Matter Not Fully Considered
When the appellate court considers a matter sua sponte for the first
time it means that the litigants have not been given an opportunity to
consider the matter and urge arguments in support of and against the
position adopted by the reviewing court. If the question had been raised
there is at least a possibility that other facts or other authorities might
have been presented which might have changed the court's attitude
on the matter.71 But this opportunity is not given to the losing party.
69. 337 U.S. 1, 8, 9, and 11.
70. "(I]t is . . . the settled practice of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the
federal courts, that it considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not pressed
or passed upon in the courts below. . . " McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-
tique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940) ; Robertson and Kirkham, jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, §§ 87, 418 (2d ed., Wolfson & Kurland, 1951).
71. An analogous argument is urged that all arguments must be presented at the lowest
level. Unless the argument is presented at that time the litigants are not in a position to
bring all counterarguments-law and fact-to the attention of the court. Consistently courts
have required full disclosure-full presentation of the arguments-at the trial level. "One
of the rules of well nigh universal application established by courts in the administration
of the law is that questions not raised and properly presented for review in the trial court
will not be reviewed on appeal.... The reason for the rule is plain. If the question had
been raised below, the situation might have been met by the opposite party by way of
amendment or of additional proof. In such circumstances, therefore, for the appellate
court to take up and decide on an incomplete record questions raised before it for the first
time would, in many instances, at least, result in great injustices, and for that reason ap-
pellate courts ordinarily decline to review questions raised for the first time in the appellate
court." Cappon v. O'Day, 165 Wis. 486, 490-91, 162 N.W. 655, 657 (1917). This argument
is certainly as valid for matters considered sua sponte as it is for matters urged by litigants
for the first time at the appellate level. See also Kurtz v. Kurtz, 228 Iowa 256, 290 N.W.
686 (1940); Daley v. Brown, 167 N.Y. 381, 60 N.E. 752 (1901); Osgood v. Toole, 60 N.Y.
475 (1875).
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When considered sua sponte both parties are taken completely by
surprise and the court decides the matter on grounds not urged by
either. Neither has had any opportunity to consider the matter, and both
are now bound by res judicata grounded on considerations which represent
not well reasoned positions for the litigants, but rather only the fortuitous
decision of a wayward court.72
Again the argument is made that orderly presentation of proceedings
requires presentation of the matter by the litigants so that it can be
fully considered. Appellate courts are entitled to and should have the
assistance of the attorneys for the litigants.73  To ask appellate courts
to take the record on appeal and do all of the analytical and research
work is not reasonable. 74 For this reason, reviewing courts have generally
been unwilling to consider cases on review unless the problems are
presented with accompanying briefs.7 5 Understanding this attitude of
72. An appellate court, when faced with a question, rather than consider the matter
sua sponte, might send the case back down to the lower court to allow that court to
consider the matter. See note 136 infra. This would make the decision on the matter one
reflecting the consideration of a trial court and the counsel in the case. Another possibility
would be to order a reargument of the case on the question which seems to be controlling,
thereby hearing the views of the litigants. As to the latter suggestions, see note 73 infra.
In a footnote in his concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379
n.2 (1958) Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated, "It is of course not a rigid rule of this Court to
restrict consideration of a case merely to arguments advanced by counsel. Presumably
certiorari was not granted in this case simply to review the evidence under an accepted
rule of law. The solution, when an issue of real importance to the administration of
criminal justice has not been argued by counsel, is not to perpetuate a bad rule but to set
the case down for reargument with a view to re-examining that rule."
In Mr. justice Butler's dissenting opinion in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
88 (1938) he stated, "Against the protest of those joining in this opinion, the Court
declines to assign the case for reargument. It may not justly be assumed that the labor
and argument of counsel for the parties would not disclose the right conclusion and aid
the Court in the statement of reasons to support it."
73. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941), wherein the Court in discussing
why an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised in the trial court
stated, "it is equally essential in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final
decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence."
See also Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Properly Raised and Preserved, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 147, 173 (1933) wherein it is stated, "It is
the duty of counsel to know their cases more thoroughly than the court can know them,
and to give the court the benefit of this more thorough knowledge. Courts cannot always
save clients from the results of the carelessness of their attorneys." Bruce, The American
Judge 154 (1924).
74. "An assignment of errors is required for the benefit of the opposing party and the
court. Where the opposing party makes no objection to his opponent's failure to assign
an error, the only objection to its consideration is the convenience of the court." Campbell,
Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Pre-
served, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 147, 163.
75. "No authorities are cited; no grounds are stated, nor is the point supported by
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courts generally, it then becomes easier to understand the reluctance of
courts to consider sua sponte matters not urged on appeal. If the court
decides to go outside the case made by the litigants, it becomes necessary
for the court to do all of the work, analytical and research, with ab-
solutely no assistance from the parties.76 In view of the vast workload
facing most appellate courts, this very practical consideration becomes
extremely important. Even were a court inclined to consider a matter
sua sponte, the labor involved would tend to make the court hesitate. 7
IV. OVERT RATIONALE IN CASES DECIDED ON
MATTER RAISED SUA SPONTE
It must be recognized that action by an appellate court may be the
result of the interplay of numerous factors on at least three levels. An
obvious one is the legalisms found in the opinion, the articulated reasons
for decisions. A second factor might be one consciously considered but
not described in the opinion. This can be of various sorts. The most
extreme case would be the bribe given to the dishonest judge. The judge
does not talk of a bribe in his opinion, but from the point of view
of meaningful analysis of his action,"8 it is extremely important to know
of the bribe-factor. Such influences can be much more subtle and
complex. For example, the judge who decides a case involving a factual
argument. This is inadequate briefing, and the question is not for consideration... 2
Dailey v. Town of Ludlow, 102 Vt. 312, 147 AtI. 771 (1929); "Appellant has neither
designated nor argued in his brief any error arising from the trial court's holding that the
complaint fails to state a claim. Failure to comply in this regard with Rule 19 of this
Court . . .will warrant an affirmance of the judgment without further consideration....
The Court of Appeals has no duty to search the record for error upon a ground neither
briefed nor argued." Murphy v. Citizens Bank, 244 F.2d 511, 512 (10th Cir. 1957);
accord, Edmondson v. Alameda County, 24 Cal. 349 (1864); Bigelow v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 206 Iowa 884, 221 N.W. 661 (1928); A. Makray, Inc. v. McCullough, 103 N.J.L.
346, 135 Ati. 815 (1927); Hatcher v. Roberson, 63 Okla. 296, 164 Pac. 1141 (1917). As to a
criminal appeal submitted upon the record: People v. Wilder, 52 Cal. App. 320, 198 Pac.
841 (1921) (examine the record only so far as to determine whether fundamental right
violated, and other points are waived); People v. Medaini, 40 Cal. App. 676, 181 Pac. 673
(1919) (same).
76. But see Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 364, 365-66, 78 N.W. 590 (1899), stating "Twenty-
two assignments of error are presented in plaintiff's brief, more than half of which are not
argued, either orally or in the brief; and we shall assume from that fact that they are
abandoned, and shall not consider them. This court ordinarily will not assume the labor
of searching for grounds to support assignments of error which counsel deem unworthy of
argument, though we should not, for that reason, ignore an assignment which presented a
palpable and obvious error prejudicial to justice."
77. See Cappon v. O'Day, 165 Wis. 486, 490, 162 N.W. 655, 656 (1917), where the
court required briefs filed on a question not raised in the court below.
78. See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938) (former Senior Yudge
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice and
defraud the United States).
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situation closely akin to his own personal circumstances where personal
involvement becomes great. Religion, prior personal experience, racial
background, personal predilections-all of these may be factors that
will be consciously considered in deciding a case.79
A third factor might be one not identified as such by the judge-
one not consciously perceived. Legal writers have not reported on this
type of influence, and this is quite understandable since this is not purely
a legal problem. This does not mean, however, that this factor is un-
important. "We are born with predispositions; and the process of edu-
cation, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect
them in judging situations ....,0
We may then conclude regarding the three types of factors-the
articulated, the consciously perceived but unarticulated, and the uncon-
sciously perceived-that only the first can be expressed meaningfully
in traditional legal terms. The second, not classifiable and fragmentary,
is not of any lasting value as precedent. It forms no part of the great
body of decisions which forms the common law. Materials concerning
the influencing factors at levels other than the articulated are extremely
hard if not impossible to discover. This is not to say that such levels
are not important; certainly a complete picture requires a total under-
standing of all levels,8 ' but this is not now possible. We then must sketch
the picture with the colors we have at hand; but we must recognize
that the picture is not a whole one. Some shades and pigments are
missing.
All of this does not mean that the articulated rationale presented by
courts is unimportant. Quite the contrary; there are many reasons why
79. On the matter of extra-legal considerations in deciding cases, see Frank, Are Judges
Human?, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17 (1931); Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in England,
39 Harv. L. Rev. 832 (1926); and see Northrop, Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its
Nature and Significance, 59 Yale L.J. 196 (1950). See also Frankfurter and Landis, Busi-
ness of the Supreme Court 310 (1927) ("the process of constitutional interpretation
compels the translation of policy into judgment, and the controlling conceptions of the
Justices are their 'idealized political picture' of the existing social order. Only the conscious
recognition of the nature of this exercise of the judicial process will protect policy from
being narrowly construed as the reflex of discredited assumptions or the abstract formula-
tion of unconscious bias"); 2 Holmes-Laski Letters 1364 (1953) ("humbug of the judge
as a soulless automation whose mind and heart are silent when he performs his opera-
tions. .... ).
80. In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943). See also Frank, Courts
on Trial 146 (1949).
81. "My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more; logic, and
history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces
which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces shall
dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of




such decisions are extremely important." Such legalisms form a frame-
work within which courts operate. Stare decisis is a vital force in the
adjudicatory process; 83 "The strongest strand that ties a judge to previous
decisions is the desire to avoid the intolerable burden of personal
responsibility. He no more wants to be free than we want him to be." 4
Courts demand arguments in the terms of decided cases. This is the
language of courts and lawyers, and even though a judge may consider
other factors decisive, he must have a rationale in legal terms which
will allow him to reach the desired results. All of this should be borne
in mind in considering the legalistic discussion which follows. It is,
however, a good idea, occasionally, to step back and get a complete
picture of the adjudicatory process.
When an appellate court decides a case upon matters not urged by
the litigants in that court, it may simply avoid mention of the shift in
the basis and write an opinion discussing the facts and the applicable
law as the court sees it, and so decide the case. Unless there is a
dissenting opinion noting the fact,85 only the attorneys for the litigants
will be aware that the court has decided the case on issues not argued to
the court. There is no possible way of knowing whether this is a common
82. "In recent years, the attitudes of observers toward this distinctive language of the
law have varied between two polar extremes. At one extreme the uncritical assume that
this language has some peculiar, compulsive, autonomous control over social processes-
over relations between people-independently of concrete power structures, personalities
and other aspects of the immediate contest. At the other extreme cynics deride this language
as meaningless. In such extremes of ignorance, it is not surprising that there has been little
understanding of the role that authoritative doctrine does, and can be made to play, among
other interdependent variables, in affecting individual behavior and social processes in the
distribution of values." McDougal, The Law School of the Future; From Legal Realism
to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 Yale L.J. 1345, 1346 (1947).
83. "Legal learning is largely built around the principle known as stare decisis ...
Like a coral reef, the common law thus becomes a structure of fossils. . . . Precedents
largely govern the conclusions and surround the reasoning of lawyers and judges ...
Under this doctrine decisions made today become the guide and precedent by which future
similar cases will be governed." Jackson, The Struggle for judicial Supremacy 295 (1941).
84. Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 79 (1947). "The legal tradition gives the Court
that subtle pride which springs from the humility of knowing you are only a part of some-
thing vaster than yourself." Cardozo, Selected Writings 112 (1947).
85. See Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 83, 78 N.W.2d 491, 503 (1956), where the
dissenters point out that a proposition in the majority opinion was not urged in the trial
court, and never presented on appeal. One judge may feel very strongly about a matter,
so that such feeling becomes a vital part of the jurisprudence of the court during his tenure
on the bench, and perhaps continuing beyond his time. For example, on the matter of
considering a matter sua sponte, Justice Garfield of the Supreme Court of Iowa has been
very articulate concerning his disapproval, as evidenced by his dissents in Elson v. Security
State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525 (1955) and Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d
110, 125 (Iowa 1948).
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occurrence or whether this happens only rarely. Certainly, there is
some evidence that this has happened on occasion.
On the other hand, the court may face squarely the problem of sua
sponte consideration of issues, and state that the instant case warranted
a departure from the usual rule in such matters. Courts at this point will
usually indicate some reason for the decision to go beyond the case made
by the litigants.
Some courts of review operate within a framework which specifically
authorizes the consideration of issues not raised by the parties.8 One
example of this is found in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States wherein it is provided that "errors not specified according
to this rule will be disregarded, save as the court, at its option, may
notice a plain error not assigned or specified. '8 7 The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide: "Plain errors or defects affecting sub-
stantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court. 88 Another example of this is found in a statute
of Wisconsin which provides: "In any action or proceeding brought to
the supreme court by an appeal or writ of error, if it shall appear to
that court from the record, that the real controversy has not been
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for any reason mis-
carried, the supreme court may in its discretion reverse the judg-
ment or order appealed from, regardless of the question whether
proper motions, objections or exception appear in the record or not....,,
Such provisions in statutes or rules, although not establishing definite
rules governing the area, certainly indicate an attitude which should be
reflected in the decisions of the court. Such provisions, since they make
discretionary the consideration of matters sua sponte, can be nothing
more than signposts; the applicable rules must be ascertained by an
examination of the decided cases. In the long run, there may be some
reason to question whether this type of provision, or the restricting
86. "The defendant did not raise in the trial court or in this court the questions which
we shall hereafter discuss. However, under the provisions of section 793.18 . . . w are
directed, in our consideration of an appeal in a criminal case, to '. . . examine the record,
without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties, and render such judgment on the record as the law demands; . . .'" State v.
Cusick, 84 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Iowa 1957). See also Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 3.27, "Plain errors
affecting substantial rights may be considered . . . on appeal, in the discretion of
the court, though not raised in the trial court or preserved for review, or defectively raised
or preserved, when the court deems that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted therefrom." 2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1919 (1956) "The Supreme Court may,
at its option, consider a plain error not specified in appellant's brief."
87. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States 27(6).
88. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
89. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 251.09 (West 1957).
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type of provision,9 ° will have any real effect. One might, after examining
a number of decisions on this point, conclude that courts in all jurisdic-
tions regardless of statutes or rules, react in a common manner when
faced with such problems.9 1 The question is not one of power but rather
of administration. The question is "should the court" not "does the
court have power.192
A. Jurisdiction
When the general rule concerning the restricting of appellate review
to matters urged by the litigants is stated, often a statement concerning
the exception of jurisdictional defects *ill be appended.93 Even when
such exception is not specifically provided for, it is implied. Since juris-
diction involves the essential power of the court, it has been consistently
held that an appellate court must sua sponte examine its jurisdiction
and the jurisdiction of the trial court and if either is defective, the
reviewing court must dismiss. The litigants cannot by consent give
a court jurisdiction."4
90. Iowa R. Civ. P. 344(a) (4) (Third) "Errors or propositions not stated or argued
shall be deemed waived." Md. Code Ann. art. 5, § 4 (1957), "The court from whose judg-
ment or order an appeal is taken . . . shall immediately upon the entry of the order for
appeal certify and state the questions raised in and decided by such court; and no question
which shall not appear by such certificate to have been raised in said court shall be con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals." Tex. Ann. Rules of Civ. P. 476 (Vernon 1948), "Trials in
the Supreme Court shall be only upon the questions of law raised by the assignments of
error in the application for writ of error, or upon the questions of law which were certified
to the Supreme Court from a Court of Civil Appeals." See also notes 18 and 19 supra.
91. In considering appellate procedure in equity cases, Professor Orfield stated, "In a
number of jurisdictions the statutes or rules of court reserve to the court the power to
consider 'plain errors' which are not assigned. Even in the absence of statute or rule the
appellate court has the power to review." Orfield, Appellate Procedure in Equity Cases,
90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 563, 579 (1942).
92. See Cappon v. O'Day, 165 Wis. 486, 491, 162 N.W. 655, 657 (1917). "The
appellate court . . . has to consider whether or not it will relieve the defendant from
the omissions of his attorney, and consider the questions none the less. In the absence
of any statutory restriction the appellate court has the power to consider the questions.
Some courts rest the power on the general authority to supervise the inferior courts.
Others put it on the single duty of all courts to administer justice. The power itself is
clear. The real problem is, when should the power be exercised?" Orfield, Criminal Appeals
in America 95 (1939).
93. "And whether that court [Circuit Court] had or had not jurisdiction, is a question
which we must examine and determine, even if the parties forbear to make it, or consent
that the case be considered upon its merits." Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 587
(1888). Contra, Patterson v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., 107 Ind. 497, 8 N.E.
554 (1886) (court refused to consider question of jurisdiction of the subject matter). On
raising jurisdictional questions for the first time on appeal, see Elliott, Appellate Procedure
§ 498 (1892).
94. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951). See also Hampton v. Des
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The question of the jurisdiction of the appellate court can involve anr
one of a number of different problems. In a recent Iowa case a question
arose concerning the rendition of a final judgment in the trial court. If
no final judgment had been handed down, then appeal could be had only
under the rule governing appeals from interlocutory rulings. 95 The court
noted: "While plaintiff has not moved to dismiss the appeal or urged
the lack of our jurisdiction, we cannot gain jurisdiction by such silence
on her part. It is our duty to reject an appeal not authorized by statute."96
A similar consideration of the jurisdiction of an appellate court sua
sponte, by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is found in
Council of Western Elec. Technical Employees v. Western Elec. Co.,
wherein the court was faced with a question of the stay of proceed-
ings and was not certain whether it had jurisdiction. The court
noted: "The first question, although the parties have not raised it, is
whether we have any jurisdiction over the appeal. ' 97 The court then
held that it did have jurisdiction.
The appellate court must go beyond the question of its own jurisdic-
tion, that is, whether the appeal is within the permissible scope of
examination by the court, and must sua sponte examine the proceeding
in the lower court to consider the jurisdictional basis of action at that
level. "An appellate federal court must satisfy itself not only of its
own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in a cause under
review." '98 The same thing was stated in a hotly contested case in the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the following language: "I do not
question the propriety of reversing a judgment when the record presents
a state of facts which clearly shows that the court below had no jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter of the action, even though the defendant may
not have raised any objection upon that ground."99 It is possible to
conclude that there is one exception to the general rule against con-
sidering items or issues not presented by the litigants. "The first and
fundamental question is that of the jurisdiction of the appellate court,
and of the court from which the appeal came; and this question to
court is bound to ask itself, whether suggested or not ..... 00
Moines & Cent. Iowa Ry., 216 Iowa 640, 249 N.W. 436 (1933); Stucker v. County of
Muscatine, 87 N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1958).
95. Iowa R. Civ. P. 332.
96. Crowe v. De Soto Consol. School Dist., 246 Iowa 38, 40, 66 N.W.2d 859, 860
(1954); accord, Forte v. Schlick, 248 Iowa 1327, 85 N.W.2d 549, 552 (1957).
97. 238 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1956). For a similar approach by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, see Guerin v. Guerin, 239 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1956).
98. Mitchell v. Mauer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). See also Pacific Freight Lines v.
United States, 239 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1956).
99. Nightingale v. Barnes, 47 Wis. 389, 398, 2 N.W. 767, 773 (1879) (dissenting opinion).
100. Simkins, Federal Practice § 1016 (1st ed. 1934).
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However, having established this exception, it is necessary to examine
the matter more closely. Jurisdiction is a misleading, nebulous word that
requires definition. In this particular context, the courts, almost without
exception, are referring to jurisdiction of the subject matter rather than
jurisdiction of the person of the litigants. 1 '
Jurisdiction of the subject matter can relate to the power of either the
appellate court or the trial court. In the appellate court certain pro-
cedural steps may be viewed by the court as jurisdiction. Service of
notice of appeal, for example, may be so labeled. If the appellant then
fails to serve such notice within the proper period, the court will say
that it does not have jurisdiction. In courts of limited jurisdiction, such
as the federal district courts, the problem of jurisdiction of the subject
matter arises with some frequency,'0 2 and the consideration and impor-
tance of such question is considered in Rule 12 (h) of the Federal Rules.
Even in courts of general jurisdiction, the problem will arise occasionally.
One concept which apparently involves jurisdiction of the subject matter
is that of the indispensable party. Although there may be some question
about the essential nature of indispensability, 103 many courts and writers
view it as jurisdictional.' "The want of indispensable parties ... may
be raised for the first time on appeal; and there are authorities to the
101. In any discussion of questions raised for the first time on appeal, when juris-
dictional questions are mentioned, almost without exception the jurisdiction referred to is
that of the subject matter. Note, however, should be taken of the doctrine of exclusive
primary jurisdiction which has been articulated by the federal courts. Recently the Supreme
Court stated, "Before this Court neither side has questioned the validity of the lower court's
views in these respects. Nevertheless, because we regard the maintenance of a proper rela-
tionship between the courts and the Commission in matters affecting transportation policy
to be of continuing public concern, we have been constrained to inquire into this aspect
of the decision." United States v. Western Pacific R.R. (1956) 352 U.S. 59, 63.
As to the possibility of raising jurisdiction of the person for the first time on appeal, see
Elliott, Appellate Procedure § 137, specifically § 182 (1892). See also Wines, Establishing
the Basis for Appellate Review, U. Ill. L. Forum 135 (1952).
102. For a decision dealing with the limited jurisdiction of a justice of peace court see
Nightingale v. Barnes, 47 Wis. 389, 2 N.W. 767 (1879).
103. See Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Warner v. First
Nat'l Bank, 236 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1956); Moore, Federal Practice § 19.05 [2] (2d ed. 1948)
("barring exceptional equities, it should not proceed without his joinder, even though his
citizenship would not destroy jurisdiction in the cases of diversity and alienage, or although
it is immaterial, as when jurisdiction is based on the character of the subject matter-a
federal question. . . . the matter is so vital that an appellate court, sua sponte if necessary,
may consider it although the point was not raised in the trial court.")
104. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, Tex. & Mex. Ry., 229 F.2d 59
(8th Cir. 1956); Morgan v. Blatchley, 33 W. Va. 155, 158, 10 S.E. 282, 283 (1889), citing
Barton, Chancery Practice, that "although no objection be made [in the court of
appeals], the court itself will regard it, of its own motion, and will reverse the same for
lack of proper parties, and send it back, that the person whose presence is necessary to a
just and final adjudication of the case may be brought before the court."
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effect that, where the want thereof is apparent from the record, the
appellate court should sua sponte raise the question and remand the
cause."' 05 The same idea has been stated by the Pennsylvania court in
these words:
It is a settled rule of equity jurisprudence that as the absence of an indispensable
party goes to the jurisdiction of the court, an objection to the proceeding on that
ground may be raised at any time, during the hearing or on an appeal from the
decree of the trial court. The court may, of its own motion for the like reason,
raise and pass upon the objection, and if the ground of want of jurisdiction be not
removed by bringing the proper parties on the record as parties to the proceedings
the chancellor may dismiss the bill.106
Thus a broad articulation of one exception to the rule against sua
sponte consideration of matter on appeal is possible. Courts with great
consistency have initiated a consideration of jurisdictional matters. Since
such matters go to the elemental power of the courts, the rationale is
easily presented. The litigants, by inaction, cannot grant power to a
court; the grant of power must come from the legislature. The courts
must respect the limitations imposed by the legislature and guard against
possible attempts to expand such jurisdiction.
B. Contra Bonas Mores
Occasionally a court will label a certain matter contra bonas mores.
Whether this is a rationale for a conclusion already determined or a
step in a process of reasoning to a conclusion is debatable. However,
even when the matter is raised sua sponte, if the court concludes that
the matter is contra bonas mores it will refuse to grant any relief.1
0 T
For example, one court, considering an apparently illegal arrangement,
said:
Although this point was not raised in argument in the briefs, we are justified in
suggesting it and enforcing it by the doctrine of Jackson v. Baker, . . . where the
court . . . laid down the rule thus: "If the illegality appears from the complaint
105. Tod v. Crisman, 123 Iowa 693, 700, 99 N.W. 686, 689 (1904). See also Shearer v.
Murphy, 63 Kan. 537, 539, 66 Pac. 240, 241 (1901), "A judgment can operate only on the
parties properly before the court, and if an indispensable party is not before the court so
as to be bound by the judgment, it would be as futile for a reviewing tribunal to affirm it
as it was for the trial court to render it."
106. Hartley v. Langkamp, 243 Pa. 550, 556, 90 At. 402, 404 (1914).
107. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880) (excellent statement of position of
Supreme Court).
"Where a contract is in terms contra bonos mores, it is not necessary for the defendant
to plead the objections. A court will not proceed to judgment upon it, even where both
parties assent thereto. In such cases there can be no waiver. The defense is allowed not
for the sake of the parties, but for the sake of the law itself." Crichfield v. Bermudez
Asphalt Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466, 473, 51 N.E. 552, 558 (1898). Dunham v. Presby, 120 Mass.
285 (1876) (concerning contract which called for illegal trade during the Civil War).
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or the plaintiff's case, the court will, at any stage of the proceedings, dismiss the
action, although such illegality is not pleaded as a defense, or insisted upon by the
parties, and may have been expressly waived by them. It is an objection which
the court itself is bound to raise in the due administration of justice, regardless of the
wishes of the parties."' 08
Another court, considering the same question, stated:
We do not mean to say that, if a suit were brought for services in committing a
murder, there must be a recovery because -the petition was not challenged. In such
cases, the vitals of the true principle would be absent. The true application is to
permit the litigants over matters of private right to say for themselves what the
dispute is, and that certain proof will warrant a recovery. In the imagined case, the
court would have a duty to act sua sponte, because, while the parties may stipulate
as to private rights, they cannot stipulate as to public rights, nor may they stipulate
against public policy.109
C. Fundamental Error
Without attempting to circumscribe the area covered, courts have oc-
casionally stated that fundamental error can be considered sua sponte.
As one court stated recently: "We shall not undertake to give an all-
inclusive definition of fundamental error; but . . . we do hold that an
error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public
generally, as that interest is declared in the statutes or Constitution
of this state, is a fundamental error.""' This court has suggested that
if a matter is fundamental error, it will be considered even though it is
not properly before the appellate court.""
Some courts have suggested that if it clearly appears that the party
has no cause of action-not that he has failed to plead a cause of action-
then the appellate court should note the matter sua sponte." 2 "Where a
108. Newport Const. Co. v. Porter, 118 Ore. 127, 135, 246 Pac. 211, 214 (1926).
109. Heiman v. Felder, 178 Iowa 740, 751, 160 N.W. 234, 239 (1916).
110. Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex, 196, 202, 205 S.W.2d 979, 983 (1947) (right to con-
sider errors assigned and errors which are fundamental and which appear on the face of
the record).
111. Although there may be some question about the matter, the failure to allege a
cause of action is not such a fundamental error that it should serve as the grounds for a
reversal. A litigant should not be able to wait until an appellate hearing to raise such a
question, and an appellate court should not rest a decision on a matter which the litigant
has, in the nature of things, waived. Heiman v. Felder, 178 Iowa 740, 160 N.W. 234 (1916) ;
Berly v. Sias, 152 Tex. 176, 255 S.W.2d 505 (1953) (citing a number of Texas cases). Com-
pare Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h); Iowa R. Civ. P. 110; and Kipp v. Lichtenstein, 79 Ill. 358
(1875); Sargent Co. v. Baublis, 215 Ill. 428, 74 N.E. 455 (1905) (citing a number of
Illinois cases). See also Wines, Establishing the Basis for Appellate Review, Ill. L. Forum
135, 142 (1952).
112. A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1907), in
which the Court stated, "This proviso [rule of court) was and is intended, in the interest
of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public duty, to take
cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, especially such as
clearly demonstrate that the suitor has no cause of action."
1958-59]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
record on appeal discloses a matter which necessarily will prove fatal to
a recovery as a final result, the appellate court will recognize and enforce
it at the time it first appears."' 1 3 This then turns not on what was
omitted in the lower court or on the failure of an attorney to do a par-
ticular thing but rather on a fundamental weakness in the case. This
suggests that when there is an irreparable defect in the cause of
action the appellate court should note the defect sua sponte and render
a decision based on the defect."-4
Somewhat short of the situations where the party under no circum-
stances has a cause of action are the cases reaching an appellate court
where error-plain error-has been committed. As indicated above,
court rules or statutes giving appellate courts the power to consider
matter sua sponte probably do not add to the power of the courts in
this area, but such statutes and rules do suggest the nature of the
power of the courts. A number of states, by rule or statute, have
established a policy of getting appellate decisions based on the sub-
stantial rights of the individuals without regard for technicalities. A
number of such rules admonish the court to examine "the record"
or the "entire record." ' 15 When the federal rule refers to "plain error,"
it suggests that appellate review includes an examination of the record
to find any such error, and that the court will consider such matter sua
sponte. Although this is a question of degree, it seems clear that the
Supreme Court, and appellate courts generally, will consider only clearly
113. State ex rel. Moscow Concrete Inc. v. American Sur. Co., 77 Idaho 17, 25, 285
P.2d 1056, 1060-61 (1955).
114. "If it appears from the record that the necessary fact is impossible of proof,
the rule fails with the reason. The record at present does not sustain the claim. Until it is
made to appear that the record does not, and cannot, by supplying omitted evidence, be
made to sustain the verdict, the verdict must stand." Smith & Sargent v. American Car
Sprinkler Co., 78 N.H. 152, 160, 97 At. 872, 876 (1916) (claim of irreparable deficiency);
cf. Woodward v. Bullock, 27 N.J. Eq. 507, 510 (1875), wherein the court stated, "Where a
cause . . . comes up for review, and a point is made here which could not be obviated in
the court below by proof or amendment, this court ought not to refuse cognizance of
such point."
"An appellate court should not, and will not, consider different theories or new
questions, if proof might have been offered to refute or overcome them had they been
presented at the trial. . . . But, quite obviously, the present is not such a case. Here, the
issue involved the meaning of the written contract between the parties. The writing was
in the record; each party had full opportunity to adduce all pertinent evidence bearing on
its construction; and there is no claim or suggestion that either party would or could have
offered any further evidence." Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342,
349, 126 N.E.2d 271, 274 (1955) (this did involve a matter argued to the appellate court,
one which the court considered as if not argued to the trial court; but see note 3, 308
N.Y. at 349). See also Osgood v. Toole, 60 N.Y. 475 (1875).
115. Ala. Code tit. 15, § 389 (1940); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1715B (1956); Iowa Code
§ 793.18 (1954); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 632.06 (1947); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3409 (1956).
See also text at notes 87, 88, and 89 supra.
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apparent errors of real importance. As the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit stated: "It is manifest, however, that the rule does not
intend that we are to sift the record and deal with questions which are of
small importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon
inspection and of a controlling character. The underlying purpose of
this reservation in the rule is to prevent the miscarriage of justice from
oversight.""' 6 One state court, relying on a state supreme court rule,
referring to the rule's "saving grace," stated: "It is true that as an
ultimate safeguard against a situation where some great wrong might
be rendered incurable because of a mere procedural omission, provision
is made that plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered
on appeal in the discretion of the court ... when the court deems that
manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom."' 17
Another state court, without the benefit of a rule or statute authorizing
consideration sua sponte, reached about the same conclusion, stating:
"Notwithstanding these general rules, we do not think they are, at all
times and under all circumstances inflexible. The appellate courts may
in their discretion, and sometimes do, disregard the same, in order to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. . . . We think the substantial rights
of litigants are of greater weight than the inadvertence or omissions of
their attorneys.""' This should be recognized as a problem of degree
involving a determination of just how far a court should go in departing
from the general rule in order to serve best the interests of society and
to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Most courts apparently feel that
there should be some reluctance to break the pattern of judicial conduct
and consider matters sua sponte." 9 On the other hand, it is true that
some courts seem relatively more willing to serve the interest of sub-
stantial justice by refusing to leave the control of the course of the
litigation entirely in the hands of the litigants. As one court stated:
"If the mode thus selected impels the speedy enforcement of a right, or
induces the hasty redress of a wrong, and, as a correct exposition of
the law is appropriate to the facts involved, it is controlling and ought
to be adopted, though the legal principle applied may not have been
suggested by either party."' 20
116. P. P. Mast & Co. v. Superior Drill Co., 154 Fed. 45, 51 (6th Cir. 1907).
117. Harrison v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 251 S.W.2d 348, 353-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
118. King Solomon v. Mary Verna Mining Co., 22 Colo. App. 528, 531-32, 127 Pac. 129,
131 (1912).
119. "There may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will
prompt a reviewing or appelate court where injustice might otherwise result, to consider
questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative
agency below." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941); accord, Sisco v. McNutt,
209 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1954); Frieze v. West American Ins. Co., 190 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.
1951).
120. Patty v. Salem Flouring Mills, 53 Ore. 350, 364, 100 Pac. 298, 300 (1909).
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Most courts evince a willingness to examine criminal cases and consider
matters sua sponte to guarantee a fair trial for the accused. The
Supreme Court of the United States has said: "[T]his Court in a criminal
case may notice material error within its power to correct, even though
that error is not specifically challenged and certainly should do so ...
where life is at stake ... "21 and "although this question was not properly
raised, yet if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital
to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it.'
1 22
D. Sua Sponte Consideration to Affirm
Some courts have used consideration of matters sua sponte to do
substantial justice in other circumstances. The rationale is cast in terms
of affirming a correct judgment. For example, "reviewing courts were
concerned with the result and not with the reason, and that if a trial
court makes a correct ruling but assigns an incorrect reason its judgment
will not be reversed.' 23  Another court adopted the same position,
using the following language: "[A] judgment correct in ultimate effect
will not be disturbed on review although the authority below relied upon
erroneous reasoning ... ,24 In a surprisingly large number of cases
in a number of jurisdictions this doctrine has been articulated and fol-
lowed.125 The courts seem to be willing to affirm on unargued reasoning
but seem less willing to reverse on matters not considered by the lower
court. The primary consideration, then, seems to be the feelings of the
trial judge and not the rights of the litigants. The courts seem to suggest
that they will use any available reasoning to support a decision
rendered.26 But if the trial court was wrong, then a litigant must follow
121. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1946).
122. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896) ; accord, Ayers v. United States,
58 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1932). See also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
123. Reidelberger v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 8 Ill. 2d 121, 124, 133 N.E.2d 272, 274
(1956).
124. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comin'n, 239 F.2d 97, 101 (10th
Cir. 1956).
125. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Burgert v. Union Pac. R.R., 240
F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Ginsburg
v. Black, 237 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1956); Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 F.2d
997 (8th Cir. 1945); Lautenbach v. Meredith, 240 Iowa 166, 35 N.W.2d 870 (1949);
Merkel v. Merkel, 247 Iowa 495, 73 N.W.2d 75 (1955) (citing Iowa Code § 619.16);
McManus v. Park, 287 Mo. 109, 229 S.W. 211 (1921). See aiso Bailey v. O'Fallon, 30
Colo. 419, 70 Pac. 755 (1902) and In re Smith's Will, 245 Iowa 38, 60 N.W.2d 866 (1953).
See also Justice Garfield dissenting in Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d 110, 125 (1948);
substituted opinion, 240 Iowa 393, 35 N.W.2d 66 (1948).
126. See Schmidt v. United States, 63 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir. 1933), in which the
court stated, "There is respectable authority for the holding that such an amendment in
support of the judgment may be treated as having been made in the lower court. Where
the trial court receives evidence without objection, the pleadings will, on appeal, be pre-
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the rules precisely or the judgment will be affirmed regardless of the
erroneous nature of the ruling. This reflects to some extent the idea that
the error must be called to the attention of the trial court and if it is
not, then the parties have, in the nature of things, waived that particular
error. 
1 2 7
Other attitudes or reasons back of this particular rule include the
idea that appellate courts should seek to affirm decisions rather than
reverse judgments .' 2  As one court stated, "This court seeks to affirm
judgments rather than to reverse them."' 29 Another reason presented
is that it would be folly for an appellate court to reverse a decision
because based upon an incorrect reason when it was apparent that the
correct result had been reached.130 "It would be wasteful to send a case
back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made
but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on
another ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate."''
This attitude is found not only in the decisions of courts but also in the
statutes controlling appellate review. For example, the Virginia Code
provides: "No judgment or decree shall be arrested or reversed: ... (8)
For any other defect, imperfection, or omission in the record, or for
any error committed on the trial when it plainly appears from the
record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a
fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached."'' 32
E. Interpretation of Instruments
At least some appellate courts have spelled out another exception to
the general rule against sua sponte consideration of matters, this in the
case of the interpretation of instruments. It is felt that the appellate
court is competent to give an authoritative interpretation of the language.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated:
The real question in the case is, what effect is to be given to that clause of the deed?
And although not raised in the court below or discussed by counsel, it is nevertheless
before us in the case, and must be considered in order to determine whether the
verdict of the jury ought to stand. . . . We shall, therefore, be compelled to treat
sumed to have been amended if such amendment is necessary to support the judgment,
and this court may presume the pleadings to have been amended to conform to the proof,
or will permit an amendment in this court where the record so warrants."
127. As to waiver, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) (h).
128. Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1956); Siebrand v. Gossnell, 234
F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1956).
129. First Nat'l Bank v. Hinkle, 65 Okla. 62, 64, 162 Pac. 1092, 1094 (1917); accord,
Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N.E. 714 (1908).
130. Hahn v. Padre, 235 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1956).
131. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
132. Va. Code § 8-487 (1950).
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the construction of this so-called condition as an original question, without aid from
the briefs of counsel.' 3
3
The court then affirmed the decision of the lower court on the basis of
the new analysis of the deed. The same sort of approach has been urged
recently by the New York Court of Appeals in the following language:
Here, the issue involved the meaning of the written contract between the parties.
The writing was in the record; each party had full opportunity to adduce all per-
tinent evidence bearing on its construction; and there is no claim or suggestion that
either party would or could have offered any further evidence. In that state of the
record, the Appellate Division was not limited to a choice between the opposing
constructions contended for, at the trial, but was privileged to give to the contract a
"meaning conceivably . . different from that which either party justifiably attached
to the words."'134
V. CONCLUSION
The generally applicable rule seems to be that appellate courts are
reluctant to interfere with the course of litigation determined by the
attorneys for the parties, and that generally the courts will allow the
parties to determine the nature of the question presented to the courts." 5
The heavy workload of most appellate courts makes impossible any
other course as a general policy; most reviewing courts simply do not
have the time to do original research into every case coming before
the court.13 6 Moreover, there seems to be a feeling that deference to
the lower court precludes examination in terms other than those in
which the case was presented to the lower courts,'137 and this reduces
sua sponte consideration of issues by reviewing courts.1'3  However,
it must be recognized that there are exceptions to the general rule
against sua sponte consideration of legal issues.
Courts are generally reluctant to cast these exceptions in absolutes;
rather they seem to want to maintain freedom of action, so that the
133. Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 291-92, 18 N.W. 175, 177 (1884).
134. Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 349, 126 N.E.2d 271,
274 (1955).
135. But see A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1907),
stating, "That counsel does not fully recognize and urge a principle of law in argument
which is embraced within the pleadings or presented in the record cannot preclude the
court from giving due consideration and application to a rule of law which is determinative
of the controversy." See notes 73-76 supra.
136. Of course, the appellate court could note the existence of the unargued, undecided
question and remand the case to the lower court for consideration of the matter. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 184 U.S. 416 (1902) and United
States v. Shelby Iron Co., 273 U.S. 571 (1927). This was the course recommended by the
dissenting Justice in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). This course is ap-
parently rarely followed.
137. Harrison v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 251 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
138. See pp. 490-93.
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exceptions are articulated in terms of "grace" and "discretion" with no
rigid rules established. 139 But common-law concepts are so strong that,
regardless of the language, the courts do tend to establish a pattern of
action in facing these exceptional situations. Without a doubt the courts
refuse to allow the litigants absolute control of the course of litigation,
and the actions of the courts do fall into rough categories so that some
predictive analysis is possible.
Appellate courts have consistently stated that the question of the
jurisdiction of either the trial court or the appellate court can be raised
sua sponte by the appellate court. There is a strong thread running
through present-day procedure which allows the question of jurisdiction
of the subject matter to be raised anytime prior to the final decision
of the case. The logic seems to be that since this goes to the essential
power of the court to adjudicate in the matter, there can be no estoppel
and no waiver.
[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United
States is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its own
motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of
all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not
affirmatively appear in the record on which, in the exercise of that power, it is
called to act. On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question
is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the
record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even
when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of' the parties
to it.140
An examination of the cases indicates that the area of sua sponte
consideration is not limited to jurisdictional matters. Other questions
are raised and considered by courts on their own motion. Occasionally
an appellate court will consider a matter sua sponte because of the
demands of justice.14' This is a reflection of one of the purposes of
appellate review-justice for the parties. Such a decision to probe
into the case apparently reflects a number of different factors. Among
139. Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 204 Iowa 678, 683, 216 N.W. 41,
43 (1927), "Our investigation of the record is not to be taken as a precedent for per-
missive violation of the rules." Clavin v. Semple, 90 Minn. 491, 97 N.W. 1117, 1118 (1903),
"By considering the merits of this case in the absence of assignments of error, we do not
wish to be understood as establishing a precedent which will require us to do so at any
time in the future." I
140. Mansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
141. "Rule 11 of this court . . . respecting the assignment of errors, declares that 'the
court, at its option, may notice plain errors not assigned.' This proviso was and is intended,
in the interest of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public duty,
to take cognizance of palpable error in the face of the record and proceedings. . . ." A. San-
taella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1907).
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those considered are whether great additional work is involved142 and
whether the matter to be considered sua sponte is clear and overwhelming
in its impact.14  When the matter involves more than just the individuals,
and involves a reflection on the courts and the judicial system, there is
more willingness to consider it sua sponte.
When consideration of a matter sua sponte will result in an affirmance,
and consequently, in the eyes of the appellate court, strengthen respect
for the judicial system, the courts are more willing to consider the
matter."4 If all cases are not to be considered de novo by appellate
courts, then some rational categories should be established regarding
the matters to be considered sua sponte. Perhaps the character of the
error or the nature of the rights involved should be considered in deciding
whether a court will consider certain matters sua sponte. It does not
seem logical, however, to key everything to the result which is called for
in the appellate court, that is, whether the court would affirm or reverse. 145
142. For example, "We do not pass upon matters not decided by the lower court except
where judicial notice supplies the omission . . ."; Dermott Drainage Dist. v. Cherry, 217
Ark. 829, 836-37, 233 S.W.2d 387, 391 (1950); Jackson, The Supreme Court in the
American Scheme of Government 13 (1955). When the matter involves the interpretation
of a contract, the courts apparently feel that little additional burden is assumed, so they
are willing to give sua sponte consideration. See notes 133 and 134 supra. See also text at
notes 74 and 75 supra.
143. For example, Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 126
N.E.2d 271 (1955).
144. The implementation of the doctrine of sua sponte consideration only to affirm
can lead to some very anomalous results. The ultimate outcome of the litigation can well
turn on the question of the nature of the error at the trial level. If the injured party sues
and wins on an incorrect theory in the lower court, the appellate court might affirm on
the correct theory. On the other hand, if the trial court makes a more egregious error and
rules for the defendant on the incorrect theory, the appellate court will not reverse even
though the correct theory demands it. To say that litigants must allow the nature of the
error committed by the trial court to control rather than the rights of the litigants is
foolish to say the least. For apparent confusion in this matter, see the dissent of Justice
Garfield in Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d 110, 126-27 (1948), substituted opinion in
240 Iowa 393, 35 N.W.2d 66 (1948), wherein that judge noted, "The majority has no
right to reach out and supply the principal ground on which it holds this act void. In
doing so it has assumed the role of advocate. This is a plain violation of the fundamental
rule, repeatedly and universally recognized, that a reversal will not be ordered on a
ground not properly raised in the court below, much less upon one not advanced in this
court. . . . Nor is this court concluded by one of the arguments of the attorney general
(nor by his entire argument for that matter), in defense of the measure." Can the court
act the part of the advocate or not? Only to affirm? Only to uphold a measure as
constitutional ?
145. Certainly there should be some relationship between the results obtaining and the
merits of the controversy. Mechanical tests, unrelated to the rights of the parties, should
be rejected. The continuing danger in procedure is that of exalting rules and mechanical
tests over the merits of the controversy. See, e.g., Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The
Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 255 (1954), wherein
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On occasion the appellate court will recognize in a case a question of
public policy which the litigants either through choice or inadvertence
have failed to raise. If the question involves a fundamental question of
the public policy of the jurisdiction, the court will raise the question and
decide the case on the matter.
Since the establishing of the corpus juris is of primary importance in
appellate review, absolute control by the litigants is somewhat anomalous.
There have been a number of occasions when extremely important
questions have come before appellate courts where there was some reason
to believe that there was lack of adequate representation on one side.' 46
Where only private rights are involved, then perhaps there is no reason
for overriding the control of the parties. But where public rights are
involved or where law of wide application is being established through
stare decisis for the public at large, the interest of the public should
control.
It may be that in private litigation the plaintiff should himself and alone decide what
issues he wants tried. For he is the litigant and it is his litigation. But here we are
dealing with something more than private litigation. When what the Court is really
doing amounts in fact to a determination of governmental policy, it is preposterous
to let a party's choice of a lawyer frame the issue.147
It would seem appropriate for the court to be free in deciding what the
legal question is in such a case. Any other conclusion would seriously
circumscribe the appellate court in its very vital, jurisprudential function
of establishing the law.
Since case-by-case adjudication affords a very imperfect vehicle for
the articulation of the corpus juris of a jurisdiction,'148 judges are
occasionally forced to use cases to present a particular ruling when
the litigants have not asked for it. When there is a pressing need for a
statement of a point of law, the court may be forced to go outside the
issues posed by the litigants. The classic case, of course, is Erie R.R.
a common law-type of strictness is suggested with no possible modification for the aber-
rational case.
146. See Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 22-23 (1947); Jackson, The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy 153 (1941); Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 84 (1949);
Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American Scheme of Government 13 (1955). See also
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (shareholder v. the corporation) ; Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); In re American States Pub. Serv. Co., 12 F. Supp. 667
(D. Md. 1935).
147. Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 149 (1947), referring to Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
148. "Judicial control . . . must from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat
the subject by the hit and miss method of deciding single local controversies upon evidence
and information limited by the narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic and unrelated in-
stances of litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national
rules .... " McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940).
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v. Tompkins.149  Although neither side asked for a re-examination of
Swift v. Tyson,'50 and both sides indicated that they felt that they were
controlled by this case, the first words of the decision of the Supreme
Court were, "The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved."'' It was apparent
that the Supreme Court used the Erie case as a vehicle for the presenta-
tion of a new concept concerning the law applied in cases not involving a
federal question. This approach is understandable when one considers
the limited opportunity the courts have to present their ideas in a
given field. The courts cannot give an advisory opinion gratuitously,
rather they must wait until some litigant wishes to raise the question.
Since this may occur only infrequently-particularly where the matter is
well established-the courts understandably may go somewhat afield
in seeking a vehicle for their pronouncement. This would seem to be
the explanation of the Erie case and other such cases. 52
Occasionally a dourt, considering the matter of the corpus juris, may
be unwilling to rule on a particular point because of the unsettled or
unsettling nature of the problem. The court then may use an unargued
point as decisive of the case.153 So the sua sponte consideration is a
two-edged sword which can be used either to pronounce new doctrine
or to avoid the making of new law.
Excepting the jurisdictional rationale which is a matter apart and
well understood, the multitude of cases wherein matters will be con-
sidered sua sponte by appellate courts reflect various factors of appellate
review. The cases are aberrational cases in which one of the justifica-
tions for appellate review overwhelms the traditional conservatism of
appellate courts. These are the cases in which the courts are moved
by considerations which seem to cry out for particular results; these are
extraordinary cases-extraordinary circumstances-which demand extra-
ordinary results.
149. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (decided upon an issue not presented by counsel in either
trial or appellate court). See justice Frankfurter dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 12 (1949). See also Jackson, The Struggle for judicial Supremacy 278 (1941).
150. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
151. 304 U.S. at 69.
152. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Court reversed and remanded
on point of statutory construction not assigned as error) ; Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139
(1900) (same).
153. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956) wherein the court
rather than facing and deciding whether a court could order a child brought up in a
particular religion, decided that the order of the lower court was void because uncertain
and indefinite. The dissent noted that "Such contention was not urged in the Court below
and was never presented to this Court. Its first appearance is in the majority opinion."
Id. at 503-04.
